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The Public Good index is a power index for simple games introduced by
Holler and later axiomatized by Holler and Packel, so that some authors also
speak of the Holler–Packel index.1 A generalization to the class of games with
transferable utility was given by Holler and Li. Here we generalize the under-
lying ideas to games with several levels of approval in the input and output –
so-called ( j, k) simple games. Corresponding axiomatizations are also provided.
Keywords: Public Good index, Public Good value, ( j, k) simple games, simple
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1 Introduction
Assume that you are submitting a paper to a computer science conference (or some
other scientific discipline with a similar reviewing convention). You paper is usually
send to several reviewers, which are typically chosen by the programming committee
or assign themselves in some kind of bidding procedure. Unattached the selection
process, for each paper there exists a set N of reviewers. The task of the reviewers is
to read and to evaluate the submitted paper. Besides some comments and remarks
in free text, a summarizing evaluation according to a certain predefined scale is
requested. A typical scale consists e.g. of the possible answers “strong accept”,
“accept”, “weak accept”, “borderline”, “weak reject”, “reject”, and “strong reject”.
After every reviewer has announced his or her evaluation, these individual opinions
are summarized to a group decision, where we assume that only the outcomes
1The paper is dedicated to the occasion of the 75th birthday of Manfred J. Holler.
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“accept” or “reject” are possible. Of course, this oversimplifies the practical setting
where we may have discussion rounds between the reviewers with the possibility
to adjust their evaluations or some kind of interaction with the authors of the paper.
Such a decision rule v may be formalized as follows: For some set of agents N and a
set of levels of approval for the input J, each vector in J|N| is mapped to an element
of the set of levels of approval in the output K. In our example we have |J| = 7 and
|K| = 2, but may also consider an output set K of cardinality three by distinguishing
between a lecture, a poster presentation, or rejection. If the options in J can be
mapped to a numerical score, like e.g. +3,+2,+1, 0,−1−, 2,−3 in our example, then
such a decision rule might be simply given by some threshold τ. I.e., accept all
papers with mean of the scores at least τ. However, rules might be more complicated
including extra conditions like e.g. requiring that no paper with at least one “strong
reject” is accepted. Given a specific decision rule v one might ask for the “influence”
of a specific agent i ∈ N on the group decision. Having only homogeneous agents
in mind this question does not seem to make too much sense. However, agents may
also be heterogeneous. In our example the reviewers may have different levels of
expertise, which is indeed a common query to the reviewer when writing his or her
evaluation. Of course, we as the author of the paper usually do not have the details
to determine the influence of the individual reviewers and should have little interest
to do so, but the author of the one day is the organizer of a huge conference the other
day and possibly in charge to design the details of the decision rules.
Taking our exemplifying story aside, we can clearly imagine situations where the
individual opinions of |N| agents from an ordered set J of inputs are mapped to an
output from an ordered set K. To this end (|J|, |K|) simple games have been introduced,
see e.g. [Freixas and Zwicker, 2003, Freixas and Zwicker, 2009], and we remark that
simple games are in one-to-one correspondence to (2, 2) simple games with J =
{0, 1} and K = {0, 1}. Measurements of influence for simple games are also called
power indices and the Public Good index, introduced in [Holler, 1982], is a particular
example. The question of this paper is whether a measure in the vein of the Public
Good index can be defined for the class of ( j, k) simple games. We motivate a few
variants and give a axiomatizations. An axiomatization of the Public Good index for
simple games was given in [Holler and Packel, 1983], so that some people also speak
of the Holler–Packel index, and the generalization to TU games was axiomatized
in [Holler and Li, 1995]. A different axiomatization, for both cases and based on
potential functions, was given in [Haradau and Napel, 2007]. For ( j, 2) simple games
a Public Good index was recently introduced in [Sébastien and Bertrand, 2020] along
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with two axiomatizations.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we sum-
marize some necessary preliminaries from the literature before we discuss different
generalizations of the Public Good index and corresponding axiomatizations to the
class of ( j, k) simple games in Section 3.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, ...,n} be a finite set of agents or voters. Any subset S of N is called
a coalition and the set of all coalitions of N is denoted by the power set 2N. For
given integers j, k ≥ 2 we denote by J = {0, . . . , j − 1} the possible input levels and by
K = {0, . . . , k − 1} the possible output levels, respectively. We write x ≤ y for x, y ∈ Rn
if xi ≤ yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N we write xS for the restriction of x ∈ Rn
to (xi)i∈S. As an abbreviation, we write x−S = xN\S. Instead of x{i} and x−{i} we write xi
and x−i, respectively. Slightly abusing notation we write a ∈ Rn, for the vector that
entirely consists of a’s, e.g., 0 for the all zero vector.
Definition 1. Let j, k ≥ 2 and n ≥ 0 be integers. A (j,k) simple game is a mapping
v : Jn → K satisfying v(0) = 0 and v(x) ≤ v(y) for all x, y ∈ Jn with x ≤ y.2
Example 1. For n = j = k = 3 let the (3, 3) simple game v be defined via
v(x) =

0 : 3x1 + 2x2 + x3 < 7
1 : 7 ≤ 3x1 + 2x2 + x3 < 12
2 : x1 = x2 = x3 = 2
for all x ∈ {0, 1, 2}3.
Definition 2. A simple game is a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} that satisfies v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1,
and v(S) ≤ v(T) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N, where the finite set N is called the player set or set
of players.3
Let v be a simple game with player set N. A subset S ⊆ N is called winning
coalition if v(S) = 1 and losing coalition otherwise. A winning coalition S ⊆ N is called
2Some authors also require v(j − 1) = k−1, which would clash with the potential function approach
as it is the case for simple games. Note that we have reversed the order of the input levels of approval
compaired to [Freixas and Zwicker, 2003].
3In some papers v(S) ≤ v(T) is dropped in the definition of a simple game and they speak of
monotonic simple games is it is additionally assumed. For the potential function approach we will drop
the condition v(N) = 1 later on, while it is indeed necessary for the normalized Public Good index.
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minimal winning coalition if all proper subsets T ( S of S are losing. The set of minimal
winning coalitions is denoted by MWC(v).
Example 2. For player set N = {1, 2, 3} let v be the simple game defined by v(S) = 1 iff
w(S) :=
∑
i∈S wi ≥ 3 and v(S) = 0 otherwise for all S ⊆ N, where w1 = 3, w2 = 2, and
w3 = 1.
The winning coalitions of the simple game from Example 2 are given by {1}, {2, 3},
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, and {1, 2, 3}. Only {1} and {2, 3} are minimal winning coalitions.
In order to embed a given simple game v : 2N → {0, 1} as a (2, 2) simple game v̂
with J = {0, 1} and K = {0, 1}, we assume N = {1, . . . ,n}. To each coalition S ⊆ N
we assign the vector xS ∈ {0, 1}n with xSi = 1 iff i ∈ S and x
S
i = 0 otherwise. Given a
vector x ∈ {0, 1}n the corresponding coalition is given by S = {i ∈ N | xi = 1}, so that
v(S) = v̂(xS).
The (raw) Public Good index for a simple game v with player set N and a player
i ∈ N is given by
PGIi(v) = | {S ∈MWC(v) | i ∈ S} |. (1)





and is e.g. efficient, i.e.,
∑
i∈N PGIi(v) = 1. Note that for the normalized version it is
important to assume that v(N) = 1 since MWC(v) is empty otherwise, so that PGIi(v)
would be undefined.
A generalization of simple games, without the monotonicity assumption, are
games with transferable utility – so-called TU games.
Definition 3. A TU game is a mapping v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0, where the finite set N is
called the player set or set of players.
If we additionally assume v(S) ≤ v(T) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N, we speak of a
monotone TU game or a capacity.
The analog of minimal winning coalitions in the context of TU games are mini-
mal crucial coalitions, see e.g. [Haradau and Napel, 2007] or real gaining coalitions, see
[Holler and Li, 1995]. To this end, we call a player i ∈ S ⊆ N crucial in a TU game
v if v(S) > v(S\i). A coalition S in which every player i is crucial is called minimal
crucial coalition and the set of minimal crucial coalitions is denoted by MCC(v). A
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coalition S ⊆ N is called a real gaining coalition if v(S)−v(T) > 0 for all proper subsets
∅ ⊆ T ( S of S. The set of all real gaining coalitions of v is denoted by RGC(v). Note
that for monotone TU games there is no difference between a minimal crucial and
a real gaining coalition, i.e., MCC(v) = RGC(v). With these generalized notions, the





so that PGIi(v) = PGVi(v) if v is a simple game.
Let Γ be a subclass of all TU games. A value on Γ is a function Ψ that maps each
game v ∈ Γ to R|N|, where N is the player set of v. An example of a value is the
Public Good value PGV, defined componentwise in Equation (3). A potential on Γ is
a function P that maps each game v ∈ Γ to a real number P(v).
Definition 4. A value Ψ on Γ admits a potential function if there exists a potential
P : Γ→ R such that
Ψi(v) = P(v) − P(v−i) (4)
for all v ∈ Γ and all i ∈ N, where N is the player set of v and v−i is the TU game with player
set N\{i} defined by v−i(S) = v(S) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i}.
Note that the subclass Γ of TU games has to be closed with respect to taking
subgames v−i in order to apply this definition. So, from a technical point of view we
either have to include the game v∅ with empty player set in the set of TU games and
subclasses of TU games Γ or define P(v∅) := 0 separately (which is the usual choice).5
As shown in [Haradau and Napel, 2007, Proposition 1] the Public Good value PGV





Note that each minimal critical coalition S in v with i < S is also a minimal critical
4Note that the authors from [Holler and Li, 1995] used the definition PGVi(v) =
∑
S∈RGC(v),i∈S v(S),
while the authors from [Haradau and Napel, 2007] used PGVi(v) =
∑
S∈MCC(v),i∈S v(S). As already
mentioned, there is no difference for monotone TU games. Also the axiomatization of the Public Good
value from [Haradau and Napel, 2007] can be slightly adjusted by replacing the notion of minimal
critical coalitions by real gaining coalitions in their definition of π(v,N) and the corresponding axiom
of distributing the worths of MCCs.
5If we do not set P(v∅) = 0, then the potential of a value is only determined up to an additive
constant.
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coalition in v−i and vice versa. Analogously, that each real gaining coalition S in v
with i < S is also a real gaining coalition in v−i and vice versa.
We say that a value Ψ on Γ distributes the sum of the worths of the minimal critical










|S| · v(S) (6)
for all v ∈ Γ, where N is the player set of v. With this, [Haradau and Napel, 2007,
Proposition 2] states that the Public Good value PGV is the unique value that admits a
potential and distributes the sum of the worths of the minimal critical coalitions for all
players on the class of monotone TU games. The great advantage of an axiomatization
via a potential is that this also gives an axiomatization for all subclasses Γ′ of TU
games that are closed with respect to taking subgames v−i. So, if we relax the
condition v(N) = 1 of a simple game, we also obtain an axiomatization for simple
games. Note that while v(N) = 1 it may happen that v−i(N\{i}) , 1, i.e., v−i does not
contain a winning coalition, which happens if player i is a so-called vetoer.
Another common property of values is linearity. To this end we note that TU
games form an R-vector space with sum (v + v′)(S) := v(S) + v′(S) and scalar multi-
plication (λ · v)(S) := λ · v(S) for all TU games v, v′ with the same player set N, all
λ ∈ R, and all S ⊆ N. With this, a value Ψ is called linear if Ψ(v + v′) = Ψ(v) + Ψ(v′)
and Ψ(λ · v) = λ ·Ψ(v). From Equation (3) we can directly conclude that the Public
Good value PGV is linear. If only the first property, on the sum of two TU games
holds, then one speaks of additivity. Since the sum of two simple game (considered
as TU games) does not need to be a simple game, the so-called transfer axiom was
introduced by Dubey [Dubey, 1975]:
Ψ(v ∧ v′) + Ψ(v ∨ v′) = Ψ(v) + Ψ(v′),
where (v ∧ v′) (S) = min{v(S), v′(S)} and (v ∨ v′) (S) = max{v(S), v′(S)} for all simple
games v, v′ with the same player set N and all coalitions S ⊆ N. Note that the
definition of ∧ and ∨might also be applied to general TU games. In our context we
only use v ⊕ v′ := v ∨ v′ for two simple or TU games v, v′. Two simple games v and
v′ are called mergeable if S ∈ MWC(v) and S′ ∈ MWC(v′) implies S * S′ and S′ * S.
Based on the identity PGIi(v ⊕ v′) = PGIi(v) + PGIi(v′) for the raw Public Good index
for two mergeable simple games was used in [Holler and Packel, 1983] to axiomatize
the normalized Public Good index. Similarly, for two ( j, k) games v and v′ we define
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(v ⊕ v′)(x) = max{v(x), v(x′)} for all x ∈ Jn, where n is the number of players of v and
v′.
3 Generalizing the Public Good index to (j,k) simple games
The first question we have to answer is that for a suitable generalization of the concept
of a minimal winning coalition in a simple game to an arbitrary ( j, k) simple game.
Having the definition of minimal critical and real gaining coalitions for TU games in
mind, we propose:
Definition 5. Let v be a ( j, k) simple game with player set N = {1, . . . ,n} and J = {0, 1, . . . , j−
1}. A vector x ∈ Jn is called minimal critical if v(x) > v(x′) for all x′ ∈ Jn with x′ ≤ x and
x′ , x. The set of minimal critical vectors of v is denoted by MCV(v).
Note that for j = 2 and k = 2 each minimal critical vector x corresponds to a
minimal winning coalition S = {1 ≤ i ≤ n | xi = 1} in the corresponding simple game.
For j = 2 and arbitrary k ≥ 2 we can embed a (2, k) simple game v as a TU game v̂, so
that the minimal critical vectors of v are in 1-to-1 correspondence with the minimal
critical coalitions of v̂.
Let Γ be a subclass of all ( j, k) simple games, where j ≥ 2 and k ≥ 2 are arbitrary
but fixed. A value on Γ is a function Ψ that maps each game v ∈ Γ to R|N|, where N is
the player set of v. A potential on Γ is a function P that maps each game v ∈ Γ to R.
Definition 6. A value Ψ on a subclass Γ of ( j, k) simple games admits a potential function
if there exists a potential P : Γ→ R such that
Ψi(v) = P(v) − P(v−i) (7)
for all v ∈ Γ and all i ∈ N, where N is the player set of v and v−i is the ( j, k) simple game with
player set N\{i} defined by v−i(x) = v(y) for all x ∈ JN\{i} and y ∈ JN with yi = 0 and y j = x j
for all j ∈ N\{i}.6 Moreover, we set P(v∅) := 0 for a game v∅ with empty player set.
Again, the subclass Γ of ( j, k) simple games has to be closed with respect to taking
subgames v−i in order to apply this definition. We observe that each minimal critical
vector x of v with xi = 0 is also a minimal critical vector of v−i if we remove the entry
for xi (so that it is a vector in JN\{i}) and vice versa. We say that a value Ψ on a subclass
6By AB we denote the set of all mappings from B to A whose cardinality is |A||B|.
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Γ of ( j, k) simple games distributes the sum of the worths of the minimal critical vectors for












∣∣∣ {1 ≤ i ≤ n | xi , 0} ∣∣∣ =: Λ(v) (8)
for all v ∈ Γ, where N = {1, . . . ,n} is the player set of v.
Theorem 1. Let j, k ≥ 2 be integers. Then, there exists a unique value Ψ on the class Γ of
all ( j, k) simple games that admits a potential function and distributes the sum of the worths










for all v ∈ Γ.
Proof. First we assume that the potential is given by Equation (10). Since Ψ admits a
potential function we have


















for all v ∈ Γ and all i in the player set of v, where we have used the relation between













∣∣∣ {1 ≤ i ≤ n | xi , 0} ∣∣∣ = Λ(v),
i.e., Ψ distributes the sum of the worths of the minimal critical vectors for all players
and so satisfies both axioms.
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for each v ∈ Γ, where N = {1, . . . ,n} is the player set of v. For each S ⊆ N we denote
by vS the ( j, k) simple game with player set S defined by vS(x) = v(y) for all x ∈ JS,
where y ∈ JN with y j = x j for all j ∈ S and y j = 0 otherwise. E.g. v−1 = vN\{i} and






for all {i} ⊆ S ⊆ N. So, starting from P̃(v∅) = 0, we can recursively compute P̃(vS) for
all ∅ , S ⊆ N, so that especially P̃(v) = P̃(vN) is uniquely defined.
We call the value Ψ for ( j, k) simple games defined by Equation (9) Public Good value
(for ( j, k) simple games). For the (3, 3) simple game v from Example 1 the minimal
critical vectors are (1, 1, 2), (1, 2, 0), (2, 0, 1), (2, 1, 0), and (2, 2, 2), where v(x) = 1 for all
x ∈MCV(v)\{(2, 2, 2)} and v((2, 2, 2)) = 2. With this we compute
Ψ1(v) = 6, Ψ2(v) = 5, and Ψ3(v) = 4
for the value Ψ characterized in Theorem 1.
We would like to remark that we also may motivate a different definition for a
Public Good value for ( j, k) simple games. To this end we define the vector y = x↓ i ∈ Jn
for each x ∈ Jn with xi , 0 by y j = x j for all j , i and yi = xi − 1. Assume that agent
i has strictly increasing costs in i and that the rewards are strictly increasing in v(x).7
As in the process of a coalition forming member by member we may imagine that
starting from x = 0 the final vector x forms step by step via the inverse operation
of ↓.8 So, similarly, as one can argue that only minimal winning coalitions will be
formed, we deduce that under the described model for every finally formed vector
7For (2, 2) simple games represented as simple games this means that entering a coalition comes
at a certain cost while a coalition gets a reward iff it is a winning coalition.
8More precisely, for each x ∈ Jn with xi , j − 1 we can define the vector y = x↑ i ∈ Jn by y j = x j for
all j , i and yi = xi + 1.
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x ∈ Jn with v(x) , 0 we have x ∈ MCV(v). Now what is the contribution of a player i
to a minimal critical vector x with xi , 0 to the worth v(x)? If the answer is v(x), then
we end up with the value characterized in Theorem 1. However, if we have a look
at the minimal critical vector x = (2, 2, 2) in the (3, 3) simple game v from Example 1,
then v(1, 2, 2) = v(2, 1, 2) = v(2, 2, 1) = 1 may justify the assumption that every player






v(x) − v(x↓ i)
)
. (12)
Note the similarity to the Banzhaf index. For simple games the difference is that we
sum over all minimal winning instead of all winning coalitions. For the (3, 3) simple
game v from Example 1 we would obtain
Ψ1(v) = 5, Ψ2(v) = 4, and Ψ3(v) = 3.
We observe that there is no difference between both variants if k = 2. And indeed,
they match the variant introduced in [Sébastien and Bertrand, 2020]. For all ( j, k)





Excluding the ( j, k) simple games v ≡ 0, we speak of non-trivial ( j, k) simple games.
Our next aim is an axiomatization for Ψ. To this end we propose a generalization of
mergeability for simple games:
Definition 7. Two ( j, k) simple games v and v′ with the same player set {1, . . . ,n} are
mergeable if
(1) MCV(v) ∩MCV(v′) = ∅;
(2) x ∈MCV(v), x′ ∈MCV(v′), x ≤ x′ ⇒ v(x) < v′(x′); and
(3) x ∈MCV(v), x′ ∈MCV(v′), x ≥ x′ ⇒ v(x) > v′(x′).
Note that (2) and (3) imply (1). Since v(x) > 0 for all x ∈ MCV(v) the definition
for (2, 2) simple games goes in line with the definition for simple games. Actually,
we have v(x) = 1 for every minimal critical vector of some ( j, 2) simple game. If
k > 2, then we have to distinguish the critical vectors according to their output value
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v(x). Next we study the relation of the minimal critical vectors of the sum of two
mergeable ( j, k) simple games with those of their “summand games”.
Lemma 1. Let v be a ( j, k) simple game with player set {1, . . . ,n}. For each vector x ∈ Jn
with v(x) > 0 there exists a vector x′ ≤ x with v(x′) = v(x) and x′ ∈MCV(v).
Proof. If x ∈ MCV(v), then the statement is true for x′ = x. Otherwise there exists
a player 1 ≤ i ≤ n with xi , 0 such that v(x) = v(x ↓ i). If x ↓ i ∈ MCV(v), then we
can set x′ = x↓ i and are done. Otherwise we iteratively apply the operator ↓ (which
terminates since the number of players and output levels is finite).
We remark that the minimal critical vector x′ does not need to be unique. To
this end we may slightly adjust the (3, 3) simple game v from Example 1 by setting
v(x) = 1 for x = (2, 2, 2).
Lemma 2. Let v and v′ be two ( j, k) simple games with the same player set {1, . . . ,n} that are
mergeable. Then, we have
MCV(v ⊕ v′) = MCV(v) ∪MCV(v′).
Proof. Consider x ∈ v ⊕ v’. Since (v ⊕ v′)(x) = max{v(x), v′(x)}we assume (v ⊕ v′)(x) =
v(x) and v′(x) ≤ v(x) w.l.o.g. If x < MCV(v), then there exists a player 1 ≤ i ≤ n with
xi , 0 such that v(x↓ i) = v(x). However, this implies (v ⊕ v′)(x↓ i) ≥ v(x↓ i) = v(x) =
(v⊕v′)(x), which is a contradiction. Thus, we have MCV(v⊕v′) ⊆MCV(v)∪MCV(v′).
Consider x ∈MCV(v). First we show v(x) > v′(x). To this end we apply Lemma 1
to conclude the existence of a vector x′ ∈ Jn with x′ ≤ x and v′(x′) = v′(x). Now the
stated inequality is implied by Definition 7.(3) and we have (v⊕v′)(x) = v(x). Assume
x <MCV(v⊕v′) for a moment. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n be a player with (v⊕v′)(x↓ i) = (v⊕v′)(x).
Since
(v ⊕ v′)(x↓ i) = max{v(x↓ i), v′(x↓ i)} ≤ max{v(x↓ i), v′(x)} < v(x) = (v ⊕ v′)(x),
we obtain a contradiction. Thus, MCV(v) ⊆ MCV(v ⊕ v′) and, by symmetry, also
MCV(v′) ⊆MCV(v ⊕ v′), so that MCV(v) ∪MCV(v′) ⊆MCV(v ⊕ v′).
Note that MCV(v) ∩MCV(v′) = ∅, i.e., we have the disjoint union MCV(v ⊕ v′) =
MCV(v) ]MCV(v′).
We say that a minimal critical vector x ∈ MCV(v) is critical for player i and output
level τ if v(x) ≥ τ and v(x↓ i) < τ. So, a given minimal critical vector x ∈MCV(v) (with
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xi , 0) is critical for v(x) − v(x↓ i) output levels. Denoting the number of pairs (x, τ)
such that x ∈ MCV(v) with xi , 0 is critical for player i with output level τ by ci(v),
we have
ci(v ⊕ v) = ci(v) + ci(v′) (14)
for two mergeable ( j, k) simple games v, v′ with player set {1, . . . ,n} and 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Definition 8. Let v be a ( j, k) simple game with player set {1, . . . ,n}. A player 1 ≤ i ≤ n is
called a null player if we have v(x) = v(x′) for all x, x′ ∈ Jn with x j = x′j for all j , i.
Note that we have xi = 0 for every null player i and every minimal critical vector
x ∈ MCV(v). The analog for simple games is that no null player is part of a minimal
winning coalition.
Definition 9. Let v be a ( j, k) simple game with player set N := {1, . . . ,n} and π : N → N
be a permutation, i.e., a bijection. The ( j, k) simple game πv is defined by (πv)(x) = v(x′) for
all x ∈ Jn where x′i = xπ(i) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
A value Φ on the class of (non-trivial) ( j, k) simple games is called anonymous if for each
permutation π : N→ N we have Ψi(πv) = Ψπ(i)(v), where N is the player set of an arbitrary
(non-trivial) ( j, k) simple game v and i ∈ N an arbitrary player.
Theorem 2. The value Ψ defined in Equation (13) and Equation (12) is the unique value for
non-trivial ( j, k) simple games that satisfies the axioms:
(A1) i is a null player in v ⇒ Ψi(v) = 0.
(A2) Ψ is efficient, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 Ψi(v) = 1.
(A3) If MCV(v) = {x} for a game v, then Ψi(v) = Ψ j(v) for all players i, j with xi, x j , 0.
(A4) For all mergeable ( j, k) simple games v, v′ with player set N we have
Ψi(v ⊕ v′) =
c(v) ·Ψi(v) + c(v′) ·Ψi(v′)
c(v) + c(v′)
for all i ∈ N, where c(ṽ) =
∑
j∈N c j(ṽ) for every non-trivial ( j, k) simple game ṽ with
player set N.
Proof. It is immediate that the value Ψ defined in Equation (13) and Equation (12)
satisfies the axioms (A1), (A2), and (A3). For (A4) we first note Ψi(ṽ) = ci(ṽ) for every
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( j, k) simple game ṽ and every player i in ṽ. Using the mergeability of v and v′ we
compute







c(v) ·Ψi(v) + c(v′) ·Ψi(v′)
c(v) + c(v′)
.
Conversely, given any value Φ on the class of non-trivial ( j, k) simple games
satisfying the axioms (A1) through (A4) we proceed as follows. First we consider an
arbitrary non-trivial ( j, k) simple game v with |MCV(v)| = 1 and let x be the unique
minimal critical vector. From (A1), (A2), and (A3) we conclude
Φi(v) =
 1 / |{ j | x j , 0}| if xi , 0,0 otherwise.
Now consider any non-trivial (j,k) simple game ṽ with player set N and minimal
critical vectors enumerated as MCV(ṽ) =
{
x1, . . . , xm
}
. Denoting the non-trivial ( j, k)
simple game with unique minimal critical vector xh by vh, where 1 ≤ h ≤ m, we can
write
ṽ = v1 ⊕ v2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vm.
Note that the vh are sequentially mergeable in the sense that vh+1 and v1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vh are
mergeable for each h = 1, 2, . . . ,m − 1. We can extend (A4) inductively to a sum of








Thus, the axiom (A1)-(A4) allow us to compute Φi(ṽ) for each non-trival ( j, k) simple
game ṽ and each player i of ṽ, i.e., there is at most one value satisfying axioms
(A1)-(A4). So, given our first observation on Ψ, we conclude Φ = Ψ.
We remark that the axioms (A1) and (A2) mimic similar axioms for simple or
TU games that are used frequently in the literature. For axiom (A4) we refer to the
discussion in [Holler and Packel, 1983] noting that the proof of Theorem 2 is rather
similar to the one of [Holler and Packel, 1983, Section III]. Note that for k = 2 output
levels axiom (A3) can be replaced by anonymity, see Definition 9. However, for
k > 2 we need some kind of stronger axiom in order to uniquely define the value
of non-trivial ( j, k) simple games with a unique minimal critical vector. Of course,
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axiom (A3) might be considered to be too demanding for the cases where xi, x j , 0
and xi , x j. There is an ongoing discussion about properties that a reasonable power
index or value should have, see e.g. [Allingham, 1975, Kurz, 2020]. We would also
like to point the reader to the two axiomatizations of the Public Good index for ( j, 2)
simple games in [Sébastien and Bertrand, 2020], which share several axioms on the
one hand and use a few different on the other hand.
Another approach to motivate the definition of a value for ( j, k) simple games is
pursued in [Kurz et al., 2021] for the Shapley value.
Definition 10. Let v be an arbitrary ( j, k) simple game with player set N = {1, . . . ,n}. The







v((j − 1)S , x−S) − v(0S , x−S)
]
(15)
for all S ⊆ N.
For the (3, 3) simple game v from Example 1 the average game ṽ is given by
ṽ(∅) = 0, ṽ({1}) = 12 , ṽ({2}) =
5
18 , ṽ({3}) =
1
6 , ṽ({1, 2}) =
2
3 , ṽ({1, 3}) =
2
3 , ṽ({2, 3}) =
1
2 , and
ṽ({1, 2, 3}) = 1. Note that ṽ always is a TU game taking values between 0 and 1.
In [Kurz et al., 2021, Theorem 4.1] it was shown that the Shapley value of a ( j, k)
simple game v, as defined in e.g. [Freixas, 2005], equals the Shapley value of the
TU game ṽ. Unfortunately there is no such nice relation between the Public Good
value and our analogs for ( j, k) simple games since for the (3, 3) simple game from











To sum up, we have seen that different generalizations of the Public Good value
for TU games or the normalized Public Good index for simple games to the class of
(non-trivial) ( j, k) simple games, including axiomatizations, are possible. As antici-
pated e.g. in [Freixas, 2012], a power index for simple games can admit more than one
reasonable extension for ( j, k) simple games. From our personal point of view, Theo-
rem 1 provides the most convincing variant. But this may be just a matter of taste or
might depend on the application. The question of the public good properties of the
proposed values is not touched at all. As done in [Sébastien and Bertrand, 2020] for
( j, 2) simple games, other power indices based on Riker’s Size Principle [Riker, 1962,
p. 32] may be treated similarly.
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